

~~SECRET~~
Safe File: West Africa
/501

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

7 May 1941

Dear Mr. President:

I am sending this over to you just as I received it late this afternoon. I have only glanced through it. It was hurried up and therefore is not a finished paper. The detailed study of this project is proceeding and for the moment I am withholding criticism of it. It does give a lead on their thoughts, some of which I can agree with and some of which I cannot.

I am sending for another copy for myself so that I may go into it more carefully.

I shall send this over to Harry Hopkins to be held until such time as you feel like going through it. I told "Mac" I proposed not to bother you with a thing for the present.

I am also sending you the latest we have on the disposition of the French Fleet.

I do hope you round to quickly but in any case this is one time when the Commander in Chief takes orders from his Medical Officer.
I hope,

Sincerely,

Betty.

The President,
The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ART. 0445,
OPNAVINST. 5510.1G BY OP
By RH/RS Date 10/1/82

a74a01

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ART. 0445

BRIEF
of

Study on Occupying a Base in West Africa OPNAVINST 5510.1C BY OP

LOCATION OF BASE.

By RAHOK Date OCT 10 197

Base selected should be Dakar. Only other site worth considering is Freetown. Climate, health conditions, communications, base facilities and ease of defense, all favor Dakar. Not practicable to maintain base at Freetown with Dakar in hostile hands.

FORCES REQUIRED.

Dakar is well defended and its seizure would require a major operation. Assistance to the defending forces by Axis Powers must be expected. Cape Verde Islands probably also would have to be occupied to protect communications to Dakar.

100,000 Army troops, including an armored division, 500 planes, 100 transports and corresponding supporting naval vessels would be required for this operation.

THE TIME FACTOR.

Necessary forces not available until Sept. 1st and then only if we suspend present commitments as to operations to be carried out in Iceland and the British Isles under ABC-1. Time required for necessary preliminary joint training with Navy and overseas movement will prevent expedition from reaching West Africa prior to November 1st.

ADVANTAGES.

Should British lose present war, our possession of base for sea and air forces in West Africa would be advantageous to hemisphere defense by permitting more effective control of sea lanes from Europe to South America. For our participation in present war, a base in West Africa would be useful only in the protection of friendly shipping in the South Atlantic.

DISADVANTAGES.

This operation would not contribute materially toward winning the present war and it is not vital to hemisphere defense. It would seriously delay our capacity to establish an air force in England to strike directly at Germany until the spring of 1942. It would require the diversion of a large amount of shipping away from the vital theater. Once committed on the African continent we may be drawn into operations requiring forces and logistic measures out of all proportion to the value of our West African base. This may involve an indefinite postponement of decisive offensive operations against Germany in Europe. This operation would interfere with our long-range training program, very seriously as to antiaircraft artillery.

CONCLUSIONS. The disadvantages involved in undertaking the establishment of a base in West Africa far outweigh the advantages of our possession of a base there.

a74a02

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-12-2-EH
(SC)NB/EF13-28
Serial-053412

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON


~~SECRET~~


MAY 7 1941

~~SECRET~~

From: Joint Strategic Planning Committee.
To : Joint Planning Committee.
Subject: Study of the Occupation of a Base in West Africa.
Enclosure: (1) Brief of Study.
(2) Study in detail.

1. The enclosed study of the "Occupation of a Base in West Africa" is submitted.


C.W. BUNDY
Lieutenant Colonel (G.S.C.) USA


OSCAR SMITH
Captain, USN

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ART. 0445,

OPNAVINST 5510.1C BY OP

By RHPR Date OGT 10 1972

a74a03

BRIEF
OF
Study on Occupying a Base in West Africa

LOCATION OF BASE.

Base selected should be Dakar. Only other site worth considering is Freetown. Climate, health conditions, communications, base facilities and ease of defense, all favor Dakar. Not practicable to maintain base at Freetown with Dakar in hostile hands.

FORCES REQUIRED.

Dakar is well defended and its seizure would require a major operation. Assistance to the defending forces by Axis Powers must be expected. Cape Verde Islands probably also would have to be occupied to protect communications to Dakar.

100,000 Army troops, including an armored division, 500 planes, 100 transports and corresponding supporting naval vessels would be required for this operation.

THE TIME FACTOR.

Necessary forces not available until Sept. 1st and then only if we suspend present commitments as to operations to be carried out in Iceland and the British Isles under ABC-1. Time required for necessary preliminary joint training with navy and overseas movement will prevent expedition from reaching West Africa prior to November 1st.

ADVANTAGES.

Should British lose present war, our possession of base for sea and air forces in West Africa would be advantageous to hemisphere defense by permitting more effective control of sea lanes from Europe to South America. For our participation in present war, a base in West Africa would be useful only in the protection of friendly shipping in the South Atlantic.

DISADVANTAGES.

This operation would contribute little or nothing towards winning the present war and it is not essential to hemisphere defense. It would delay our capacity to establish an air force in England to strike directly at Germany until the spring of 1942. It would interfere with our long-range

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ART. 0445,

OPNAVINST 5510. 1C BY OP

By RAH/RB Date OCT 10 1914

~~SECRET~~

BRIEF
of
Study on Occupying a Base in West Africa (Cont'd)

DISADVANTAGES (Continued)

training program, particularly as to antiaircraft artillery. It would require the diversion of a large amount of shipping away from the vital theater. Once committed on the African continent we may be drawn into operations requiring forces and logistic measures out of all proportion to the value of our West African base. This may involve an indefinite postponement of decisive offensive operations against Germany in Europe.

CONCLUSIONS.

The disadvantages involved in undertaking the establishment of a base in West Africa far outweigh the advantages of our possession of a base there.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ART. 0445,

OPNAVINST 5510.1C BY OP

By RAH/PA Date OCT 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

a74a05

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ART. 0445,

OPNAVINST 5510. 1C BY OP

By RAAB Date OCT 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

STUDY OF THE OCCUPATION OF A

May 7, 1941

BASE IN WEST AFRICA

1. PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to investigate the feasibility and desirability of the occupation by the United States of a base in West Africa. The study is based upon the assumption that the object of occupying such a base would be to secure it for the use of our own air and naval forces in hemisphere defense and to deny it to the Axis Powers.

2. POSSIBLE BASE SITES.

The only points in the area under consideration having an adequate harbor for a naval base and practicable sites for an air base (land and seaplane) are Dakar and Freetown. Neither Bathurst (Gambia) nor Bolama (Portuguese Guinea) has an adequate harbor for a base although either or both might be used for the subsidiary operations of small forces.

Freetown is the port of the British colony of Sierra Leone. It has the advantage of being in friendly hands and its initial occupation should, therefore, be comparatively easy. However, the British defense forces now there are not believed adequate to insure against its falling into unfriendly hands, particularly if information should leak out of a possible intention on our part to occupy it. Available information indicates that Freetown is not so well suited as Dakar for an air base, owing to probable difficulties of providing adequate landing fields for the necessary dispersion of air forces. Climatic conditions at Freetown are very unfavorable for Americans. Communications are scarce. Freetown would be subject to air bombardment from Dakar and possibly to attack by ground forces based at that place. Hostile air and naval forces based at Dakar could seriously threaten our communications with Freetown.

Dakar has every natural advantage as a base site. Climatic conditions are much better than those of Freetown. Communications are comparatively good. Good airfields and seaplane facilities now exist at Dakar, as well as numerous landing fields throughout French West Africa. The harbor has been well developed as a major French naval base. The peninsular location of Dakar is favorable for defense against land attack. The outstanding disadvantage of Dakar is the fact that it is strongly defended. Reliable information indicates that there are some 34 seacoast guns, 3 to 12 inch;

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of AR 0445~~SECRET~~OPNAVINST 551A 1C 840PBy RAH/RS Date OCT 10 1972~~SECRET~~

20,000 troops at Dakar, and probably an additional 20,000 in the hinterland; an airforce of 5 squadrons of Martin bombers and 3 squadrons of pursuit; 1 battleship, aground but capable of firing its guns, 2 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 12 submarines.

Considering the advantages and disadvantages of both places, it is believed that the choice of a base site in West Africa rests with Dakar. Even if the decision were to occupy Freetown initially, it would be necessary ultimately to occupy Dakar in order to deny it to the enemy.

3. OPERATIONS INVOLVED AND FORCES REQUIRED.

It is visualized that the operations required in order to occupy a base in West Africa would include the establishment of an advanced base for long-range land and seaplanes in Freetown and probably a land base for short-range aircraft in Bathurst, followed by air operations from these bases for the purpose of gaining air superiority over the Dakar Area. It may also be found desirable to occupy the Cape Verde Islands as an advanced base for air and light naval forces. As soon as the necessary air superiority is obtained a landing attack would be launched probably within thirty miles of Dakar followed by an overland advance and capture of the Dakar Peninsula.

An alternative plan would be to establish the Army forces initially at Freetown and advance overland against Dakar - a distance of some 600 miles. The logistics difficulties of such a plan would be tremendous. Only one road exists and it would be difficult except in dry weather. No railroad exists. A long space of time would be required to establish the necessary base facilities at Freetown. This, together with the time required for the overland advance would permit the enemy to strongly reinforce Dakar. Owing to adverse climatic conditions losses from disease would be heavy. Altogether, such a plan would probably require more forces than a landing attack in the Dakar area.

It is highly important that the forces provided be adequate to insure the certainty of success of the undertaking. Our future position would be seriously compromised by a failure such as the British suffered at Dakar. Even if the French should promise only a token resistance, we should be prepared to succeed against the maximum resistance of which they are capable with such support as the Axis Powers could give. In this connection, Weygand has announced that he will oppose occupation of Dakar by any foreign power. Our operations against Dakar, therefore, probably would precipitate a definite alignment of Vichy and Weygand with the Axis.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

It is estimated that an Army force of about 100,000 troops would be required for this task. This force should include at least one armored division. An air force of at least 500 planes would be required. A large amount of shipping would be required - about 100 transports and 10 hospital ships in the initial expedition, and about 15 supply ships a month for maintenance. At least 5 aircraft carriers would be required.

The Army forces required cannot be made available prior to September 1st and then only if commitments made in the recent staff conversations with the British as to operations we would undertake in the event of our entry into the war are suspended. These commitments are: (1) the defense of Iceland, (2) the defense of our naval and air bases in the British Isles, and (3) the establishment of an air striking force in England. Considerable interference with our long-range training program, particularly as regards antiaircraft artillery, also would be entailed. Before embarking on an expedition of this sort the troops should have a period of seasoning in a tropical climate. They must have at least a month's intensive joint training with the Navy in landing operations. It is estimated that the expedition could not reach the West Coast of Africa prior to November 1st. In fact, weather conditions in that area would be unfavorable for military operations until that time owing to rain and the prevalence of storms.

Assuming that the British would improve existing aviation facilities at Freetown and Bathurst as required to permit operation of our aviation from land bases immediately upon arrival, it is estimated that the time required to capture Dakar by a landing attack would not exceed a month. If the plan calling for an overland advance from Freetown were adopted it might require six months.

4. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF OCCUPYING A BASE IN WEST AFRICA.

The western bulge of Africa, in the Dakar-Freetown region, has important strategic advantages as a base area for sea and air forces operating in the South Atlantic sea lanes. Should the British lose the present war, the possession of a secure base in this area would be of assistance to us in the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Sea and air forces based here, together with similar forces based near the eastern tip of South America, would be advantageously located to deny the Atlantic sea routes between Europe and South America to the Axis Powers.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ART. 0445,

OPNAVINST 5510.1C BY OP

By RHDB Date OCT 10 1972

-3-

a74a08

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

This area is only about 1620 miles from the eastern tip of South America and is nearer the Western Hemisphere than any other part of Africa or Europe. It would therefore be advantageous to the Axis powers as a base for operations against this Hemisphere. It is the most likely point from which those Powers might launch a movement to South America by air. The denial of this area to the Axis Powers would be advantageous from the viewpoint of hemisphere defense.

Neither the denial of this area to the Axis Powers nor its possession for our own use is an essential requirement for hemisphere defense. Depending upon our own strength, particularly at sea, compared to that of a victorious Axis, an effort to hold a base in this area might well constitute an overextension on our part.

Owing to the great distance to any important objective, the paucity of communications and the desert terrain, a base in West Africa would have little or no value for offensive operations on the continent of Africa.

The principal disadvantage to the occupation of a West African base is the effort required to secure, defend and maintain such a base and the involvements which may ensue.

It has been mentioned that the employment of the necessary forces for this operation will require the suspension of other operations in the area of the British Isles. Those operations, particularly the establishment of an air force in England to strike at the heart of Germany, will contribute far more towards winning the present war than our occupation of a base in West Africa. The establishment of an effective air striking force in England would be delayed until the spring of 1942 by diverting the necessary air forces to this operation.

As indicated above, about 100 transports, including cargo carriers, and 10 hospital ships would be required. The diversion of this number of ships would jeopardize the flow of essential supplies and munitions to England and interfere seriously with other important sea communications. Furthermore, it would be necessary to complete essential alterations in available commercial vessels to get them for this duty. Since the operation visualizes landings at open beaches or where harbor facilities are lacking, the ships must have the facilities for handling and landing their cargoes. Recent experience in converting ships for transport duty indicates that essential alteration would require months.

It would be necessary therefore at this time to withdraw the ships to be used and begin conversions. This in turn will interfere seriously with construction and repair work in the available ship yards.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ART. 0445,

OPNAVINST 5510.1C BY OP

By PHAR OCT 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

All replacements and supplies must come from the United States whose nearest ports are 3500 miles distant. Should the Axis Powers emerge victorious in the present war and have at their disposal strong naval forces they could operate against the flank of our line of communications and seriously threaten their security.

If such a base be established it is safe to assume that Axis Powers will do their utmost to capture or deny its use to us and our associates. We would be forced to a choice between a static defense or active operations in the field. History proves, corroborated by current war operations, that a static defense without heavy reinforcement rarely is successful. Furthermore, a static defense would in all probability permit the enemy to employ his air forces to deny the use of the base by our naval forces. To undertake active operations in North Africa would involve such large forces, such involved logistic measures as to be entirely out of proportion to the value of the base to be defended.

Should England be defeated in the present war the Axis Powers will be able to employ very strong forces against Dakar operating on interior lines from relatively nearby bases. While it is true that the Sahara and 2400 miles intervene between the North African coast and Dakar, there are roads through the Sahara, a net-work of airways towards Dakar, and the Germans have proved adept in supply over long distances.

In the event of our entry into the present war as an associate of England, the Axis Powers will still be able to dispose of considerable strength against a West African base. To expose ourselves to the necessity of dispatching, supplying, and maintaining a sufficient force in North Africa, would most certainly leave us but two choices: to sacrifice the defending force or to undertake operations which would involve an indefinite postponement of the eventual decisive offensive against Germany in Europe.

5. CONCLUSIONS.

a. The establishment of a base area on the West Coast of Africa requires the seizure of Dakar.

b. The seizure and establishment of a base at Dakar would require Army forces in the order of 100,000; 100 transports and 10 hospital ships, and corresponding naval vessels for escort and convoy.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ART. 0445,

OPNAVINST 5510.1C BY OP

By BAH/RS Date OCT 10 1972

~~SECRET~~

c. November 1, 1941 is the first date on which an effective expeditionary force could reach the West African Coast.

d. The effort and ensuing involvement will be so great as far to outweigh the advantages of possession of the base or denial of the base to an enemy.

6. ACTION RECOMMENDED.

It is recommended that the War and Navy Departments oppose the occupation of a base in West Africa under the existing conditions.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ART. 0445

OPNAVINST 5510.1C BY OP

By RAHRS Date OCT 10 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

March 15, 1941

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Disposition of French Fleet

Port:	BB	OBB	CV CVS	CA	CL	DL	DD	SS	PG FE	XCL
<u>French Control</u>										
Toulon	1(1)	1(2)	1(3)	4(4)	3(5)	19(6)	16(7)	30(8)	14(9)	
N. Africa	1(10)						7(11)	13(12)	2(13)	
Casablanca	1(14)				2(15)	2(16)	5(17)	4(18)	3(19)	
Dakar	1(20)				2(21)	3(22)		8(23)	5(24)	
Have left - destination unknown Beyrouth						2(25)		3(26)	2(27)	
West Indies			1(28)		2(29)				1(30)	1(31)
Indo-China					1(32)			2(33)	13(34)	
Total French	4	1	2	4	10	26	28	60	40	1
<u>British Control</u>										
England		2(35)				2(36)	7(37)	7(38)	12(39)	
Mediterranean		1(40)		3(41)	1(42)		3(43)	1(44)		
Total British		3		3	1	2	10	8	12	
<u>Lost</u>										
During Hostilities					1(45)	4(46)	6(47)	2(48)	2(49)	
Since Armistice		1(50)					1(51)	5(52)	1(53)	
Total Lost		1			1	4	7	7	3	
Scuttled								5(54)	6(55)	
Condemned							1(56)			
Total	4	5	2	7	12	32	46	80	61	1

DECLASSIFIED
Basic Source of Information: French Ministry of Marine.
By Authority of ART. 6445

OPNAVINST 5510.1G BY OP

By RAH Date OCT 10 1972~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a74a12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ART 0445

OPNAVINST 5500.1C 840P

By RAK Date OCT 10 1972

March 15, 1941

Toulon

- | | | | | |
|-----|------------|--|--|--|
| (1) | <u>BB</u> | STRASBOURG | | |
| (2) | <u>OBB</u> | PROVENCE (damaged- in drydock) | | |
| (3) | <u>CVS</u> | COMMANDANT TESTE | | |
| (4) | <u>CA</u> | ALGERIE | DUPLEIX | FOCH COLBERT |
| (5) | <u>CL</u> | MARSEILLAISE | JEAN DE VIENNE | LA GALISSONNIERE |
| (6) | <u>DL</u> | NOGADOR (damaged-
in drydock) | VOLTA
CASSARD
TARTU
AIGLE
KERSAINT
TIGRE | L'INDOMPTABLE
VATOUR
VAUQUELIN
VAUBAN
GERFAUT
PANTHERE
LE MALIN |
| | | ALBATROS
CHEVALIER PAUL
LION
VERDUN
LYNX | | |
| (7) | <u>DE</u> | L'ADROIT (ex: EPEE)
FOUDROYANT (ex: FLEURET)
SIROCO (ex: CORSAIRE)
BISON (ex: FLIBUSTIER)
BORDELAIS
TROMBE
LA POURSUIVANTE | LE HARDI
LANSQUENET
LA PALME
LE MARS
BALISTE | MAMELUK
CASQUE
FOUGUEUX
LA BAYONNAISE |
| (8) | <u>SS</u> | HEROS
VESTALE
ARGONAUTE
AURORE
LE CENTAURE
LE REDOUBTABLE
FRESNEL
VENUS
GALATEE
ATALANTE | GLORIEUX
SULTANE
PSYCHE
LE TONNANT
ARGO
PASCAL
ACTEON
PALLAS
SIRENE
PERLE | ARCHIMEDE
ARETHUSE
OREADE
LE CONQUERANTE
ABHERON
HENRI POINCARÉ
IRIS
CERES
MAIADE
DIAMANT |
| (9) | <u>PG</u> | COMMANDANT BORY | ELAN | CURIEUSE |
| | <u>PR</u> | IMPETUEUSE | CALAIS | LASSIGNY |
| | | AILETTE | SOMME | BEAUTEMPS-BEAUPRE |
| | | DUBOURDIEU | TAPAGEUSE | DEDEIGNEUSE |
| | | ENGAGEANTE | LURONNE | |

North
Africa

- | | | | |
|------|--|---------|----------|
| (10) | <u>BB</u> DUNKERQUE (Damaged) at Oran. | | |
| (11) | <u>DD</u> TRAMONTANE | TORNADE | TYPHON |
| | FRONDEUR | POMONE | BOMBARDE |
| | IPHIGENIE | | |

March 15, 1941

North

Africa (Cont'd) (12) SS CAIMAN MARSOVIN SOUFFLEUR
 REQUIN DIANE ARIANE
 EURYDICE DANAE TURQUOISE
 SAPHIR HAUTILUS CIRCE
 CALYPSO

(13) PG BATAILLEUSE CHAMOIS
 PR

Casablanca

(14) BB JEAN BART (77% completed)

(15) CL GLOIRE PRIMAGUET

(16) DL MILAN EPERVIER

(17) DD ALCYON BRESTOIS TEMPETE
 BOULANNAIS SIMOUN

(18) SS CASABLANCA THETIS MEDUSE
 ORPHEE

(19) PG COMMANDANT DELAGE BOUDEUSE GRACIEUSE
 PR

Dakar

(20) BB RICHELIEU (damaged)

(21) CL GEORGES LEYGUES MONTCALM

(22) DL LE FANTASQUE TERRIBLE
 L'AUDACIEUX

(23) SS BEVEZIERS SIDI FERRUCH ESPOIR
 VENGEUR AMPHITRITE AMAZONE
 ANTIOPE SIBYLLE

(24) PG D'ENTRECASTEAUX D'IBERVILLE GAZELLE
 PR SURPRISE COMMANDANT RIVIERE

Beyrouth

(25) DL QUEPARD VALMY

(26) SS PHOQUE DAUPHIN ESPADON

(27) PG LA GRANDIERE ANNAMITE
 PR

West Indies

(28) CV BEARN at Martinique

(29) CL EMILE BERTIN at Martinique
 JEANNE D'ARC at Guadeloupe

(30) PG VILLE D'YS at Martinique

(31) XCL BARFLEUR

DECLASSIFIED
 By Authority of ART. 0445
OPNAVINST 5510.1C BY OP
 By RAH Date OCT 10 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a 74 a 14

Indo-China(32) CL LAMOTTE PICQUET(33) SS MONGE

PEGASE

(34) PG DUMONT D'URVILLE ADMIRAL CHARNER
PR AVALANCHE VIGILANTE
 DOUDART-DE-LAGREE TOURANE
 COMMANDANT BOURDAIS ARGUS
 FRANCIS GARNIER

MARNE
 BALNY
 TAHURE
 MYTHO

England

(35) OBB PARIS at Plymouth
 COURBET at Portsmouth

(36) DL LE TRIOMPHANT at Plymouth
 LEOPARD at Portsmouth

(37) DD LA CORDELIERE L'INCOMPRISE LA MELPOMENE
 FLORE (all at Portsmouth)
 MISTRAL OURAGON BOUCLIER (all at
 Plymouth)

(38) SS SURCOUF JUNON MINERVE (all at
 Plymouth)

LA CREOLE at Swansea
 ORION ONDINE at Southampton
 RUBIS (unknown port)

(39) PG SAVORGNIAN DE BRAZZA LA CAPRICIEUSE CHEVREUIL
PR COMMANDANT DUBOC LA MOQUEUSE COUCY
 COMMANDANT DOMINE EPINAL SUIPPE
 LA CONQUERANTE ARRAS AMIENS

Britain
Mediterranean

(40) OBB LORRAINE

(All at
 Alexandria)

(41) CA DUQUESNE TOURVILLE SUFFREN

(42) CL DUGUAY-THOUIN

(43) DD LE FORTUNE BASQUE FORBIN

(44) SS PROTEE

Lost (during
 hostilities)

(45) CL PLUTON

(46) DL MAILLE BREZE *BISON JAGUAR CHACAL

(47) DD LA RAILLEUSE *H. ADROIT ORAGE BOURRASQUE
 *FOUDROYANT *SIROCO

(48) SS MORSE DORIS

(49) PG VAUQUOIS ANCRE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*These names have been given to other DD's. See Page 2, DD's at Toulon.

March 15, 1941

Britain
Mediterranean (Cont'd)

Lost (Since
Armistice)

(50) OBB BRETAGNE(51) DD BRANLE-BAS (British manned)(52) SS PERSEE AJAX PONCELET SFAX
 MARVAL(53) PG RIGALT DE GENOUILLY

Scuttled (*)

(54) SS PASTEUR OUessant ACHILLE
 AGOSTA ROLAND-MORILLOT(55) PG ANCRE DU COUEDIC YSER
 ETOUDRI AUDACIEUSE ENSEIGNE-HENRY

Condemned

(56) ODD ADVENTURIER

(*) It is reported that all submarines scuttled by the French prior to German occupation will be reconditioned by the Germans.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ART. 0445OPNAVINST 5510.1C BY OPBy RAH/BS Date OCT 10 1972

(5)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a74a16

Op-16-F-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

By RH/PA Date OCT 10 19

March 15, 1941

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Disposition of French Fleet

Port:	BB	OBB	CV CVS	CA	CL	DL	DD	SS	PG FE	XCL
<u>French Control</u>										
Toulon	1(1)	1(2)	1(3)	4(4)	3(5)	19(6)	16(7)	30(8)	14(9)	
N. Africa	1(10)						7(11)	13(12)	2(13)	
Casablanca	1(14)				2(15)	2(16)	5(17)	4(18)	3(19)	
Dakar	1(20)				2(21)	3(22)		8(23)	5(24)	
<i>have left - destination unknown</i> Beyrouth						2(25)		3(26)	2(27)	
West Indies			1(28)		2(29)				1(30)	1(31)
Indo-China					1(32)			2(33)	13(34)	
Total French	4	1	2	4	10	26	28	60	40	1
<u>British Control</u>										
England		2(35)				2(36)	7(37)	7(38)	12(39)	
Mediterranean		1(40)		3(41)	1(42)		3(43)	1(44)		
Total British		3		3	1	2	10	8	12	
<u>Lost</u>										
<u>Dur. Hostilities</u>					1(45)	4(46)	6(47)	2(48)	2(49)	
<u>Since Armistice</u>		1(50)					1(51)	5(52)	1(53)	
Total Lost		1			1	4	7	7	3	
<u>Scuttled</u>								5(54)	6(55)	
<u>Condemned</u>							1(56)			
Total	4	5	2	7	12	32	46	80	61	1

Basic Source of Information: French Ministry of Marine.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a74a17

By Authority of ART. 8445

Op-16-F-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPNAVINST 5510.1C BYOP

By RAVER Date OCT 10 1972

March 15, 1941

Toulon

- | | | | |
|-----|--|--|--|
| (1) | <u>BB</u> STRASBOURG | | |
| (2) | <u>OBB</u> PROVENCE (damaged- in drydock) | | |
| (3) | CVS COMMANDANT TESTE | | |
| (4) | <u>CA</u> ALGERIE | DUPLEIX | FOCH COLBERT |
| (5) | <u>CL</u> MARSEILLAISE | JEAN DE VIENNE | LA GALISSONNIERE |
| (6) | <u>DL</u> MOGADOR (damaged-
in drydock) | VOLTA
CASSARD
TARTU
AIGLE
KERSAINT
TIGRE | L'INDOMPTABLE
VATOUR
VAUQUELIN
VAUBAN
GERFAUT
PANTHERE
LE MALIN |
| | ALBATROS
CHEVALIER PAUL
LION
VERDUN
LYNX | | |
| (7) | <u>DB</u> | | |
| | L'ADROIT (ex: EPEE)
FOUDROYANT (ex: FLEURET)
SIROCO (ex: CORSAIRE)
BISON (ex: FLIBUSTIER)
BORDELAIS
TROMBE
LA POURSUIVANTE | LE HARDI
LANSQUENET
LA PALME
LE MARS
BALISTE | MAMELUX
CASQUE
FOUGUEUX
LA BAYONNAISE |
| (8) | <u>SS</u> HEROS
VESTALE
ARGONAUTE
AURORE
LE CENTAURE
LE REDOUBTABLE
FRESNEL
VENUS
GALATEE
ATALANTE | GLORIEUX
SULTANE
PSYCHE
LE TONNANT
ARBO
PASCAL
ACTEON
PALLAS
SIRENE
PERLE | ARCHIMEDE
ARETHUSE
OREADE
LE CONQUERANTE
ABHERON
HENRI POINCARÉ
IRIS
CERES
NAIADE
DIAMANT |
| (9) | <u>PG</u> COMMANDANT BORY
<u>PR</u> IMPETUEUSE
AILETTE
DUBOURDIEU
ENGAGEANTE | ELAN
CALAIS
SOMME
TAPAGEUSE
LIRONNE | CURIEUSE
LASSIGNY
BEAUTemps-BEAUPRE
DEDEIGNEUSE |

North Africa

- | | | | |
|------|--|---------|----------|
| (10) | <u>BB</u> DUNKERQUE (Damaged) at Oran. | | |
| (11) | <u>DD</u> TRAMONTANE | TORNADE | TYPHON |
| | FRONDEUR | POMONE | BOMBARDE |
| | IPHIGENIE | | |

March 15, 1941

North

<u>Africa</u> (Cont'd) (12)	<u>SS</u> CAIMAN REQUIN EURYDICE SAPHIR CALYPSO	MARSOVIN DIANE DANAE NAUTILUS	SOUFFLEUR ARIANE TURQUOISE CIRCE
-----------------------------	---	--	---

(13)	<u>PG</u> BATAILLEUSE <u>PR</u>	CHAMOIS
------	------------------------------------	---------

Casablanca

(14)	<u>BB</u> JEAN BART (77% completed)
------	-------------------------------------

(15)	<u>CL</u> GLOIRE	PRIMAGUET
------	------------------	-----------

(16)	<u>DL</u> MILAN	EPERVIER
------	-----------------	----------

(17)	<u>DD</u> ALCYON BOULANNAIS	BRESTOIS SIMOUN	TEMPETE
------	--------------------------------	--------------------	---------

(18)	<u>SS</u> CASABLANCA ORPHEE	THETIS	MEDUSE
------	--------------------------------	--------	--------

(19)	<u>PG</u> COMMANDANT DELAGE <u>PR</u>	BOUDEUSE	GRACIEUSE
------	--	----------	-----------

Dakar

(20)	<u>BB</u> RICHELIEU (damaged)
------	-------------------------------

(21)	<u>CL</u> GEORGES LEYGUES	MONTCALM
------	---------------------------	----------

(22)	<u>DL</u> LE FANTASQUE L'AUDACIEUX	TERRIBLE
------	---------------------------------------	----------

(23)	<u>SS</u> BEVEZIER VENGEUR ANTIOPE	SIDI FERRUCH AMPHITRITE SIBYLLE	ESPOIR AMAZONE
------	--	---------------------------------------	-------------------

(24)	<u>PG</u> D'ENTRECASTEAUX <u>PR</u> SURPRISE	D'IBERVILLE COMMANDANT RIVIERE	GAZELLE
------	---	-----------------------------------	---------

Beyrouth

(25)	<u>DL</u> QUEPARD	VALMY
------	-------------------	-------

(26)	<u>SS</u> PHOQUE	DAUPHIN	ESPADON
------	------------------	---------	---------

(27)	<u>PG</u> LA GRANDIERE <u>PR</u>	ANNAMITE
------	-------------------------------------	----------

West Indies

(28)	<u>CV</u> BEARN at Martinique
------	-------------------------------

(29)	<u>CL</u> EMILE BERTIN at Martinique JEANNE D'ARC at Guadeloupe
------	--

(30)	<u>PG</u> VILLE D'IS at Martinique
------	------------------------------------

(31)	<u>XCL</u> BARFLEUR
------	---------------------

(3)

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ART. 0445

OPNAVINST 5510.16 BY OP
By RH/RS Date OCT 10 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a74a19

~~Confidential~~DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ART. 0445,ORNAVINST 5510.1C 840P

March 15, 1941

By PHR Date OCT 10 1972Indo-China(32) CL LAMOTTE PICQUET(33) SS MONGE

PEGASE

(34) PG DUMONT D'URVILLE ADMIRAL CHARNER
PR AVALANCHE VIGILANTE
DOUDART-DE-LAGREE TOURANE
COMMANDANT BOURDAIS ARGUS
FRANCIS GARNIERMARNE
BALNY
TAHURE
MYTHOEngland(35) OBB PARIS at Plymouth
COURBET at Portsmouth(36) DL LE TRIOMPHANT at Plymouth
LEOPARD at Portsmouth(37) DD LA CORDELIERE L'INCOMPRISE
FLORE (all at Portsmouth)
MISTRAL OURAGONLA MELPOMENE
BOUCLIER (all at
Plymouth)(38) SS SURCOUF

JUNON

MINERVE (all at
Plymouth)LA CREOLE at Swansea
ORION
RUBIS (unknown port)

ONDINE at Southampton

(39) PG SAVORGNIAN DE BRAZZA LA CAPRICIEUSE
PR COMMANDANT DUBOC LA MOQUEUSE
COMMANANT DOMINE EPINAL
LA CONQUERANTE ARRASCHEVREUIL
COUCY
SUIPPE
AMIENSBritain
Mediterranean(40) OBB LORRAINE(All at
Alexandria)(41) CA DUQUESNE

TOURVILLE

SUFFREN

(42) CL DUGUAY-TROUIN(43) DD LE FORTUNE

BASQUE

FORBIE

(44) SS PROTEELost(during
hostilities)(45) CL PLUTON(46) DL MAILLE BREZE

*BISON

JAGUAR

CHACAL

(47) DD LA RAILLEUSE
*FOUDROYANT*L'ADROIT
*SIROCO

ORAGE

FOURRASQUE

(48) SS MORSE

DORIS

(49) PG VAUQUOIS

ANCRE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*These names have been given to other DD's. See Page 2, DD's at Toulon.

a74a20

March 15, 1941

Britain
Mediterranean (Cont'd)

Lost (Since
Armistice)

(50) OBB BRETAGNE(51) DD BRANLE-BAS (British manned)(52) SS PERSEE AJAX PONCELET SFAX
 NARVAL(53) PG RIGAUT DE GENOUILLY

Scuttled (*)

(54) SS PASTEUR OUESSANT ACHILLE
 AGOSTA ROLAND-MORILLOT(55) PG ANCRE DU COUEDIC YSER
 ETOUDRI AUDACIEUSE ENSEIGNE-HENRY

Condemned

(56) ODD ADVENTURIER

(*) It is reported that all submarines scuttled by the French prior to German occupation will be reconditioned by the Germans.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ART. 0445OPNAVINST 5510.1C BY OPBy RAH/RS Date OCT 10 1972

(5)

a74a21

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

June 19, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

This matter of Liberia is a military one and for this reason it is not a question of substituting Bathurst or Freetown for Liberia. Bathurst is only about 110 miles from Dakar and, therefore, too close for air safety. Freetown is a little further, but is also a bit too close to Dakar for comfort. What I want is the possibility of an American plane hopping off from Natal, Brazil, with the option of landing at any one of three places in Africa -- Bathurst, Freetown or Liberia. I regard this as an essential.

I know all about the difficulty of landing supplies and materials in Monrovia, but, by using the facilities of the Firestone Company, the material for temporary housing of white troops can be landed on lighters.

In regard to sleeping sickness and malaria, this is, of course, a danger on the whole west coast of Africa and is a risk which must also be taken at Bathurst, Freetown, Takaravia and even Legas.

Therefore, please expedite effort to make the arrangements.

F. D. R.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 18, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I refer to the memorandum you sent to the Secretary of State and myself under date of June 11 with regard to the possibility of requesting the Liberian Government to agree to have the United States send a protective force to Liberia.

I agree in principle that such a step as that contemplated would be desirable should it be found that more satisfactory arrangements of the same character could not be made at Freetown and at Bathurst. While I believe that the Liberian Government in all probability would gladly accept such a suggestion from us as that which you have in mind, there are, of course, certain immediate practical problems which would have to be taken into consideration. There is at present in Liberia an epidemic of sleeping sickness, and malaria is very prevalent. All of the accommodations which

The President,

The White House.


274502

would be required for white troops would have to be constructed by us and the lack of any harbor or harbor facilities for the landing of materials required for such construction is, of course, well known to you.

In brief, it seems to me that the objective which you have in mind could probably be achieved far more rapidly and with far less trouble by making some arrangement of this character in Bathurst or in Freetown rather than in Liberia unless and until the situation in Liberia appears to be more critical than it does at this moment.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'D. N. dhs', written over the typed phrase 'Faithfully yours,'.

a74603

207 page
in the
which contains
information
concerning the
which is being
sent to the
State Department

Hull Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 11, 1941.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
and THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

I note telegram from Walton in
Monrovia No. 55, June 7th.

I can understand the feeling of
Liberian officials that they do not want
British bases or troops in Liberia.

I think, however, that we should
consider the possibility of a request
from the Liberian Government that in
accordance with the historic, unwritten
protectorate, which the United States at
least feels toward Liberia, the United
States should send a protective force
there. Such a force could be considered
more as a token -- i.e. let us say 500
marines with 6 or 8 antiaircraft guns,
and a couple of 155 mm guns (6") for the
protection of Monrovia from shelling from
the sea.

I recognize that a force of this
size is wholly inadequate if a major
attack is made on Liberia -- but, on the
other hand, it is enough of a force to
protect Monrovia against a raid and could,
if necessary, either be withdrawn or
added to.

F.D.R.

974604

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

March 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The urgency of Ambassador Bullitt's concern as to the Middle East is justified. From a military viewpoint, the region invites attack, and its loss would permit junction by sea between the Japanese and the Germans with the disastrous consequences for the United Nations implied by such an eventuality.

Agreements with the British, prior to December 7, have always placed the Middle East in the sphere of exclusive British responsibility. However, the critical nature of the present situation is such that I have already informed Sir John Dill that the War Department stood ready to assist, in every practicable way, in improving Middle East defenses.

The principal need is for air units. Air Marshal Portal has asked General Arnold for 3 bomber groups and 2 pursuit groups. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have communicated to London a plan, (attached) developed by General Arnold, for the transfer to that region of two U. S. pursuit groups, two light groups, and one medium group -- the airplanes to come from numbers already allotted to the British in this country. Should it develop that the British requirement in the Middle East involves planes rather than operating personnel, I doubt that we can do much to help. However, we are making every possible effort to meet this situation.

Of course, the meat of the situation for us is the urgent necessity of meeting our responsibilities in the Southwest Pacific, the reinforcement of Alaskan defenses, and, above all, the gathering of air power in England. A few minutes ago I received from Admiral King a list of army planes and anti-aircraft guns guarding the fleet base at Pearl Harbor, with the statement that "the picture is not any too encouraging." The Secretary of War has found the need for additional planes in Panama. I will not elaborate on the State Department's desires for planes for South America.


Chief of Staff.



encls.
Proposal for Estab. of U.S.
Air Units in Cairo.
Memo. for Pres. from Mr.
Bullitt with memo. from
President

a74c01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ART 0445

OPNAVINST 5510.1C 840P

By RAK Date OCT 10 1972

March 15, 1941

Toulon

- (1) BB STRASBOURG
- (2) OBB PROVENCE (damaged- in drydock)
- (3) CVS COMMANDANT TESTE
- (4) CA ALGERIE DUPLEIX FOCH COLBERT
- (5) CL MARSEILLAISE JEAN DE VIENNE LA GALISSONNIERE
- (6) DL MOGADOR (damaged-
in drydock)
ALBATROS
CHEVALIER PAUL
LION
VERDUN
LYNX
- VOLTA
CASSARD
TARTU
AIGLE
KERSAINT
TIGRE
- L'INDOMPTABLE
VATOUR
VAUQUELIN
VAUBAN
GERFAUT
PANTHERE
LE MALIN
- (7) DE
L'ADROIT (ex: EPEE)
FOUDROYANT (ex: FLEURET)
SIROCO (ex: CORSAIRE)
BISON (ex: FLIBUSTIER)
BORDELAIS
TROMBE
LA POURSUIVANTE
- LE HARDI
LANSQUENET
LA PALME
LE MARS
BALISTE
- MAMELUK
CASQUE
FOUGUEUX
LA BAYONNAISE
- (8) SS HEROS
VESTALE
ARGONAUTE
AURORE
LE CENTAURE
LE REDOUBTABLE
FRESNEL
VENUS
GALATEE
ATALANTE
- GLORIEUX
SULTANE
PSYCHE
LE TONNANT
ARGO
PASCAL
ACTEON
PALLAS
SIRENE
PERLE
- ARCHIMEDE
ARETHUSE
OREADE
LE CONQUERANTE
ABHERON
HENRI POINCARE
IRIS
CERES
MAIADE
DIAMANT
- (9) PG COMMANDANT BORY
PR IMPETUEUSE
AILLETTE
DUBOURDIEU
ENGAGEANTE
- ELAN
CALAIS
SOMME
TAPAGEUSE
LURONNE
- CURIEUSE
LASSIGNY
BEAUTEMPS-BEAUPRE
DEDEIGNEUSE

North
Africa

- | | | | |
|------|--|---------|----------|
| (10) | <u>BB</u> DUNKERQUE (Damaged) at Oran. | | |
| (11) | <u>DD</u> TRAMONTANE | TORNADE | TYPHON |
| | FRONDEUR | POMONE | BOMBARDE |
| | IPHIGENIE | | |

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED
RECEIVED

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

My dear Mr. President:

I feel that I should repeat to you once more that the entire area south of Turkey remains a vacuum in respect of air force.

As you know, the British have promised to take care of the air for Turkey, if Hitler should attack Turkey. They have no planes closer to Turkey than the Lybian front, where Rommel's air force is now nearly the equal of the British air force.

If Hitler should threaten Turkey, the British would be obliged either to withdraw their entire air force from the Lybian front and send it to the Turkish frontier, - or default on their promise to Turkey.

We are not certain that Turkey will fight against German invasion even if backed up by a British or an American air force. We are almost certain that if no such air force is ready for action, Turkey will submit and permit German troops to pass through into the Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. You know the weakness of the British forces now in that area.

A small German army diverted by Hitler from the Russian front to the Turkish border could, therefore, put in desperate danger not only the east coast of the Mediterranean, the oil wells of Mosul, the Persian oil fields, and the refineries at Abadan and Bahrein, but - in cooperation with Rommel - the entire Red Sea and Persian Gulf areas.

If we should send American air units under American command to Egypt immediately, they could enter the fighting on the Lybian front at once and be ready for immediate transfer to the southern Turkish frontier. They would not be stationed somewhere awaiting a possible attack. They would be in battle from the day they should arrive.

I find that almost everyone concerned with military matters in Washington is convinced intellectually that we must reinforce the air arm in the Near East; but I can not find the will to divert aircraft from other points.

It seems to me urgent that this question should be reexamined and that we should make every effort to get into the Near East at the earliest possible moment three hundred pursuit planes and one hundred bombers with full supplies, equipment and ground units. It may already be too late.

If neither the British or ourselves are prepared now to send such an air force into the area, we should at once reexamine the construction projects under the Maxwell and Wheeler Missions. Why use shipping to construct ports, docks, assembly plants and railroads for eventual use not by the British but by the Germans?

B:ll
William C. Bullitt

Washington, D. C.,

March 13, 1942.

a74c03

Wm Bullitt's Letter

PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF U.S. AIR UNITS
IN CAIRO

1. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, appreciating the urgency of the British request for air reinforcements to the Cairo area, have explored every means of complying with that request. Our analysis indicates that there is insufficient U.S. aircraft available to meet these requirements, although personnel for the units can be made available. It is proposed that the U.S. undertake to provide the air units, and that the British make available the necessary aircraft from their production in the United States, provide the equipment necessary to make those aircraft operational, and undertake to move the units.

2. The plan proposed is as follows:

(a) The force will consist of:

- (1) An Air Force Headquarters
- (2) 1 Medium Bombardment Group
- (3) 2 Light Bombardment Groups
- (4) 2 Pursuit Groups
- (5) Essential Services.

(b) The United States will furnish all personnel and all equipment except aircraft and aircraft accessories.

(c) The British to furnish:

- (1) 60 B34 (Ventura) (medium bombers) at the at the earliest possible date, in the U.S. These aircraft to be operationally equipped, either here or in Cairo.
- (2) 160 P40 airplanes (Pursuit) to be delivered from stocks in Cairo, set up, and operationally equipped.
- (3) 60 DB7 airplanes (light bombers) delivered in the U.S. as soon as possible and operationally equipped, either in the U.S. or in Cairo.
- (4) 60 Martin 187 airplanes (light bombers) delivered in the U.S. as soon as possible, and oper-

Amos's report

a74c04

ationally equipped either in the U.S. or in Cairo.

(d) The United States will have units ready for overseas movement as follows:

- (1) Personnel for 2 Pursuit groups - April 20, 1942
- (2) Personnel for 2 light bomb groups - six weeks after receipt of total complement of aircraft.
- (3) Personnel for 1 medium bomb group - six weeks after receipt of total complement of aircraft.

(e) Aircraft of the Medium Bomb group will be flown to Egypt. Other aircraft will be shipped.

(d) Maintenance, supplies, and attrition replacements to be provided from British Production.

Pres

Safe: Winan

12-11-41
9-11-41

EH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (S)

London

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 6:17 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

RECORDED
UNCLASSIFIED

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Having now been here a month, I wanted to send you
a few brief memoranda which might be helpful.

One. MILITARY MATTERS.

A certain naval person has spent a great deal of
time in trying to familiarize Averill and myself with
the naval situation. A day never passes without my
wishing that you personally might see the map rooms
and charts and get the major naval strategy which I
feel can only be thoroughly understood by a man who
has spent a lifetime in this complicated field of modern
warfare. Without wanting to recommend anyone in par-
ticular and with very real respect for Captain Lockwood,
the Naval Attache, and his assistants, I have felt that
if Admiral Stark could not be spared, you might want to
send someone like Admiral Pratt, who I understand is
working with you, over here for a brief period in order

to

a75a01

EH -2- 1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from London.

to bring you first hand the total picture of high naval policy as it has been developed so far in this war. I am certain that the Prime Minister and all others concerned would gladly give such a man, known to be in immediate personal contact with you, the whole story. Since we are not at war there is some hesitation in turning over to the military attaches day by day the complete operational information on a routine reporting basis. The Prime Minister reminded me Sunday in limiting the detailing of certain information asked for by your air attaches that only a handful of men in his own government are familiar with complete over-all strategy. Our air service men are now given summary information covering short periods of time and information on particular situations for which they specifically ask.

I am sure you will be interested to talk to Major General Maloney, who not only did a thoroughly first rate job as a member of the Base Lease Commission, but who took advantage of his free time here to familiarize himself with the work of the British Army Staff. He had their respect and complete confidence. I sent over by him a detailed report on certain air needs and recommendations in the preparation of which both the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Aircraft Production collaborated. I requested that this report go to the Secretaries of War and Navy and to Harry.

WINANT

a75a02

DES

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

LONDON

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 6:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Two. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS.

After the Lend-Lease Bill had been passed the question of taking over the British commitments in America with particular emphasis on the resulting credit balances available to the British Treasury was taken up with me by both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I reported these conversations in my cable no. 1060, March 18, 8 p.m. forwarded to you and the Secretary of the Treasury which included a letter of Under Secretary Waley addressed to Ben Cohen summarizing the situation from the British point of view. I merely reported the deep concern expressed here without recommendations, and the matter has not since been brought up by either the Prime Minister or the Chancellor. The problem, however, will probably recur as you cannot live here and not be aware of the growing reduction of national income due to a contraction of normal business, the transfer of the energies of the people to war production and

a75a03

-2- 1309, April 3, 1941, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from London

and war services and the decline in the export trade. War strategy has been so closely related in these last few weeks to allied situations in the Balkans and elsewhere that some flexibility of action in the field of foreign exchange was necessary. It occurred to me that such situations will repeat themselves and other special British situations will arise in which it might be simpler as well as of advantage for a country at war to be able to meet financial contingencies rapidly and from its own coffers. In the present circumstances shortage of funds might not only weaken England as a first line of defense but be a sufficient threat to prompt us to find the money to meet a special situation that would be hard to explain to Congress in the time which the emergency allowed and might be particularly embarrassing to handle without Congressional action with the Johnson Act on the statute book. I just do not want you to have to face that sort of headache. These, I realize, are properly Treasury matters and we are handicapped for the moment by the absence of anyone who is kept currently informed of the financial conversations at Washington. I understand from a Department cable that this situation is being given attention.

WINANT

NPL

a75a04

EH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

London

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 8:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Keynes who is associated with the Treasury made the point to me that he thought the situation was clouded at the end of the last war because it appeared that England had used our credits for other than war materials purchased in America. For that reason he thought it would be much better all around if we should confine the Lease-Lend Bill rather strictly to war materials but would be sufficiently generous in taking care of such materials so as to make it possible for Britain to meet other obligations on her own responsibility.

There is another subject akin to this. It affects directly the use of British manpower and indirectly our own financial policy. I am told in spite of curtailment in British exports there are probably not far short of 1,000,000 persons engaged in the export trade and even a considerable number of these are still engaged in the engineering

a75a05

EH -2- 1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from London.

engineering and metal trades. This bears directly on the dollar exchange situation and the maintenance of England's trade relations. Incidentally, the continuance of this trade even in its reduced volume slows up the turn-around of ships although it involves no displacement of war cargoes. As England has extended her Near Eastern operations it has become more obvious that the effective use of her manpower is one of Britain's paramount needs and that of course in turn affects our own policy. As Beveridge put it when I talked with him the English strength in manpower is 75,000,000 with the support of 130,000,000 from the States while there are 80,000,000 Germans, 40,000,000 Italians and the supporting output of some 200,000,000 allied or subjected people.

WINANT

NPL

a75a06

DES

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 6:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

I think few people realize the extent to which modern warfare absorbs men in the supporting services. I heard Churchill say that excluding the factory it took 70 men on the ground to support a plane in the air. This came out in a discussion between Churchill and Beaverbrook in which the former was questioning the need of so high a ratio. Collateral services in air warfare are considerably more than they used to be. For example some 40,000 people are employed in the ground-signalling, the radio direction-finder services, and collateral observer corps. The British Air Force numbers approximately 500,000 men.

WINANT

NPL

a75a07

EH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

London

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 9:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

Three. Social matters. When you first spoke to me about the Ambassadorship you told me there were certain phenomena which you wanted to know and which were seldom reported to you. Except for two week ends with the Prime Minister and one with Beaverbrook, I have not been able yet to get out of London. Therefore some of the things I am reporting I have not got first hand. There are two things which have impressed me most: the first, the effort to maintain the appearance of normal life in the face of danger, and second, the patient acceptance of hardships and hazards by ordinary people. When I spoke the other day at a combined meeting of employers' and workers' representatives, I suggested that resistance required "not only skill and hard work and materials in combination with the iron will of a soldier, but an understanding that is sensitive to the devoted

a75a08

EH -2- 1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from London.

devoted loyalty of the people, and the determination to defend them in the efficiency of their giving." I hope that in allotting food you will encourage the maintenance of existing surpluses and perhaps the checking of minimum standards required for social efficiency.

WINANT

EMB

a75a09

EH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

London

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 10:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION SIX).

You wanted to know the effects of bombing. At Clydeside a week or so ago 1100 persons were killed 1600 seriously injured and a very large number of homes destroyed. I was told by competent witnesses that while the families waited to be taken to what shelters were available they rested on what little they had been able to save of their belongings, silent and unswayed, "without a tear in the lot." An apprentices' strike which was going on there was called off. Individual output increased in the region.

The effect of bombing on factories varies in different communities. Where there is courageous leadership by the mayor, the management or among the workers there has been a prompt return to work. (?) such leadership was absent the problem has been (?) particularly in night (?)

The

a75a10

EH -2- 1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION SIX) from London.

The Germans are beginning to use heavier bombs.
I saw photographs of the destruction in a workers'
dwelling area caused by a 4,000 pound German bomb.
400 people were killed and 400 houses destroyed.

WINANT

NPL

a75a11

EH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

London

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 8:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN).

The Director of Air Arms Development and a wing commander who was on the flight described to me the destruction in Emden caused by the dropping of the first English 4,000 pound bombs. It blew debris up to 1000 feet, doing damage over a wide area. In the experimental period it shok windows 16 miles away. It makes a crater of only four and a half feet. The bomb is ten feet long, thirty inches in diameter with a drum tail which apparently gives it fair direction. It carries seventy-five percent explosives, has a simple detonator at the nose only, and could be manufactured by anybody. The use of this bomb made me feel that it marked a beginning of retaliatory action.

WINANT

NPL

a75a12

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

London

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 6:20 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION EIGHT)

One of the early mistakes in workers training was limiting it to those on relief. Later a small stipend was paid during the working period this was also a mistake because it attracted the less able rather than the skilled from non-essential industries to the war industries. I am told that one of the reasons for considerable absenteeism and apparent reluctance to volunteer among women for munitions work was that wages have been lower and working conditions less attractive in such work.

The total decline in attendance at moving picture shows in all of England is only 30%.

The air raid shelters while much improved are still far from satisfactory.

I am asking Sergeant Florence, who did some work for the National Planning Board under Mr. Delano, to report on city planning which is receiving very

considerable

a75a13

-2- #1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION EIGHT) from London.

considerable attention here. Already in devastated areas people mark out their private property lines. The persistence of private property rights when rebuilding commences will make the straightening of streets a problem. Bevin has also given permission to Florence and his wife to make a study of the labor agencies as they are now functioning under his direction. This is being done.

WINANT

RR

a75a14

EH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SO)

London

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 9:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION NINE).

In order to decrease the consumption of wheat, the government plans to use ten percent of potato flour in bread. It will be done to decrease wheat shipments in order to save tonnage space for other commodities. I also understand that it is likely that the government will take over the transport system within the next three months, and that the buying of clothes will probably be rationed within a very short time. I agreed not to repeat these last three items of information except to you and the Secretary.

WINANT

NPL

a75a15

JT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

LONDON

Dated April 3, 1941

Rec'd 7:15 a.m., 4th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

1309, April 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION TEN)

The above comments on social life I have picked up largely in the course of conversations with informed people in and outside the government. There is no machinery in the Embassy to date to report systematically on such matters. An unusually able man is sadly needed for this purpose. He should be sufficiently footloose to move about.

Before leaving Washington both Green and Murray spoke to me about possibility of having a man attached to the Embassy who could report on labor and social conditions. If you and Secretary Hull felt that such a person could be assigned, I think it would help at home as well as here. Whoever is appointed should be acceptable to both Green and Murray if they are to feel that the labor field is covered. (END MESSAGE)

WINANT

WSB

a75alb

RS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (sc)

London

May 6, 1941

Rec'd 4:39 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1787, May 6, 9 p.m.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR PRESIDENT.

My number 1753, May 3, midnight.

In reference to the Prime Minister's message which came to the chancery about 1 o'clock Sunday morning, I feel you should know that I talked with the Prime Minister on the telephone early Saturday afternoon, as I planned to be away that night. He had just returned from Plymouth which was badly battered. He seemed both sad and discouraged. We talked about your message (Department's number 1471, May 1, 9 p.m.) and I had the impression that he was troubled about it. I told him it was a supporting message. He rather felt it was a message of delay. I offered to go down to see him but he told me he would not answer you until after we had lunched together on Monday, when we could talk over his reply. He asked me not to report in the meantime on our telephone conversation, further explaining that he wanted to consult with some of his people.

Our rule at the Embassy is to expedite the des(*)

Prime

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

a75601

-2-, #1787, from London, dated May 6, 1941; rec'd 4:39 p.m.

Prime Minister or from the Prime Minister to you immediately on receipt. Therefore I did not see this message before it was forwarded to you. Prior to this occasion the Prime Minister has usually discussed with me messages and always public statements bearing on Anglo-American relations.

When I saw him with Eden on Monday, they told me that they were very sorry they had failed to talk over this message with me as had been agreed by the Prime Minister. They told me it would not happen again.

I have hesitated about reporting this to you, but felt I should.

WINANT

GW

(*) omission

a75602

Winant

TEM

This telegraph must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Post

London

Lark box

Dated July 31, 1941

Rec'd 6:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3338, July 31, midnight.

PERSONAL AND ~~MOST-SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT.

"When I was in Washington I talked with Marshall. Since returning, I have seen much of Dill. I wish Marshall could know Dill's mind.

Synchronizing action here with developing policy at home may be more accurately translated if we have a returning observer. Ghormley has been most helpful in keeping me informed.

WINANT

NK

RECORDED
UNCLASSIFIED

a75c01

such boy

LONDON

Rec'd 6:43 p.m.

UNCL

~~MOST SECRET~~ TO THE ACTING SECRETARY FOR THE

There will be a problem that will come up shortly for discussion. It will have to do with a matter that Fraser, the Prime Minister of New Zealand broached with me the other day. The Australians in particular and the New Zealanders also are disturbed by the Japanese encroachments. They want very much to have the British work out with us some arrangement under which the British and ourselves could join in recognition of their situation with the object of furthering their security.

I remember

a75d01

-2-, No. 3365 from London, August 1, 1941; 6:43 p.m.

I remember very clearly the effort in the Far East to work out understandings among the Asiatic peoples--China, India and Japan--and that Japan blocked the way.

If we can count on a friendly India with China already as an ally the future problem in the Far East will be in large measure solved as well as bridged to the western world.

WINANT

GW

a75d02

RS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated August 1, 1941

Rec'd 6:47 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3365, August 1, 11 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

The British have always emphasized the problem of minorities in India, and the practical difficulties of securing an agreement on a constitution in which protection was given to the minorities and under which a stabilized state could be established. It can be argued that the war period does not permit the time and attention necessary to solve the issue, but it is also true that failing to solve it disturbs large groups both within the British empire and elsewhere in the world and handicaps the support of the war in India itself.

It might be possible at least to get agreement on the right of Dominion status for India so as to eliminate that major issue now, while at the same time giving a further pledge to implement this status within a stated period following the cessation of hostilities.

Among other considerations I believe this action
would

a75103

-2-, No. 3365 from London, August 1, 1941; 6:47 p.m.

would have a sobering effect upon the Japanese.

In my opinion a number of the Cabinet would favor such a plan. When the Indian question was up at a Cabinet meeting some time ago the Prime Minister was opposed to taking action. Unless the idea was suggested by you I doubt if this subject would again be pressed for further consideration.

(END OF MESSAGE.)

WINANT

CSB

a75d04

ALH
W. Churchill

754:53: F. 1
2/1/41
PLAIN

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 12:03 p.m.,

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6243, Twenty-seventh.

Our 6216, Twenty-fourth.

Following summaries German and Italian press comment Churchill's visit from digest twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth.

DNB Twenty-third states: "Presence Churchill in Washington is of interest to Berlin political circles in that it represents a symptom. Wilhelmstrasse view is that the catastrophic situation in Anglo-American conduct of war has led to this meeting. Leading men of Britain and United States are forced to make decisions of important and far reaching nature to meet this catastrophic situation. Wilhelmstrasse believes Roosevelt will demand certain conditions from Churchill which will deeply affect British life and which will cause clash between British and American interests. It is extremely difficult if not impossible to bring these interests under a common denominator".

TRANSOCEAN twenty-third writes from Berlin:
"Churchill's voyage to Washington is described by

Wilhelmstrasse

a75e01

-2- # 6243, December 27, from London

Wilhelmstrasse as Premier's 'penance to Canossa' while German press in headlines expressed opinion that Churchill was ordered to Washington by Roosevelt. Wilhelmstrasse adds that Germany is little interested in outcome of Washington conference."

Stefani twenty-third declares that Churchill's journey to Washington means another step by England along path of political submission to United States. Last time the two statesmen met halfway but now Churchill has gone far as White House and this has occasioned much comment. There are two hypotheses: either Churchill is in such urgent need of North American aid that he has gone to ask for it personally so as to secure absolute priority or else London has feeling Roosevelt needs advice on his first steps in the War, which actually have not been brilliant.

Noting that Litvinov is attending Washington conferences, Stefani twenty-fourth continues "He is the most cunning of the three and will easily be able to do what he likes with other two and will put interests of Bolshevism above **everything**. Litvinov is in strong position in Washington these days, in view of fact that for months only Front on which plutocracies were fighting was, by supreme irony, The Russian Front.

Russian

a75e02

-3- #6243, December 27, from London

Russian soldiers have shown themselves to be in practice the best soldiers of capitalism.

"Lord Beaverbrook's presence White House conversations strengthens hypothesis that American inclination to suspend for some time application Lend-Lease law is absolutely unacceptable to England, who took rash decision to use enormous quantity war material in Libya without thought of any economy, on the assurance this war material would be replaced for General Auchinleck quickly as possible by American industry."

SEMPA twenty-fourth declares that Churchill, the vassal of President Roosevelt, is consulting his master to determine with him whether it is preferable to strip Atlantic and Mediterranean in order to attempt resistance in Pacific or whether Anglo-Saxon powers must resign themselves to defeat in Asia.

POPOLO DI ROMA twenty-fourth notes satisfaction expressed by British press and radio over prospects that Washington conference will lead to unified democratic command and adds "They are under the illusion that such a command would be entrusted to London." Apart from this question which does not interest Axis, the paper continues, conference has no other task than that of drawing up balance sheet of disasters suffered by the

DEC 28 1941

-4- #6243, December 27, from London

by the democracies in the War which they instigated in Pacific and which has led Britain and Americans to assume a defensive position as desperate as it is sterile.

WINANT

ALC

4800
NWN

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Safe: Winant
London,

Dated February 17, 1942

Rec'd. 11:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

735, February 17, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT

At the request of Secretary Hull I cabled a brief estimate of the political situation here this morning. I wanted you also to know that I thought the Prime Minister was tired. Some of the political criticism is justified but much of it is small and petty and simply takes his time and wastes his energy. A cheery word from you and Harry always lightens his load.

WINANT

HPD

* will be forwarded as soon as received and decoded.

a75f01

Safe: Winant ~~File~~

June 17, 1942.

Dear Gil:-

I have not had a chance in the past week to thank you for yours of June third. Molotov's visit here was a real success and he actually got chummy toward the end. You certainly managed to work out that British-Russian Treaty in thoroughly acceptable form, and I think Molotov understood, after being here a few days, that if he had pressed the original it would have caused almost irreparable damage to the ideals of the war.

The Second Front is still a thorny problem to crack, but I am pushing for some more definite action.

I have had two or three good talks with Lyttelton -- and I like him much. I think he agrees with me that the situation in Lybia is by no means rosy. I would be satisfied with a drawn battle at this time.

In case of a certain visit, I am telegraphing to Winston expressing the hope that Portal will come with him.

I think you are right in not joining the Pacific Council in London. I have an idea that that Council is at this time a fifth wheel. My own Pacific Council serves primarily to disseminate information as to the progress of

a75901

operations in the Pacific -- and, secondly, to
give me a chance to keep everybody happy by
telling stories and doing most of the talking!

Thank you much for the photographs.

My best wishes to you,

As ever yours,

Honorable John G. Winant,
American Embassy,
London,
England.

*Photos sent to Elliott
with little note - in family file*

a75902

London, June 3rd, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

Since I saw you in Washington, I have been spending most of my time working on two problems: one; the Russian Treaty, and, two: the Second Front. There have been other collateral problems, but I have thought they were of secondary importance; and there is the usual routine work of the Embassy.

I believe that before the Russians reached England, I had convinced the key men here of your very real opposition to a Frontier Treaty. Both the Prime Minister and Eden did their best to persuade Molotoff of that fact, but I think you should also know that it was not until I had talked with Molotoff and personally stated to him your objections, that he abandoned his position on frontiers and agreed to recommend to Stalin the draft Treaty which I had worked on with Eden, and which, with minor changes suggested by the Russians, was accepted and signed.

Due to General Marshall's and Harry's mission here, there was a lively interest in the Second Front by responsible people when I first returned. There was also a popular demand for action, to aid Russia. Although orderly planning for invasion has continued, I have felt that there has been a dropping off of sustained interest by ranking people, so far as 1942 is concerned. The public, at the same time, has appeared to resent an effort on the part of some politicians to criticise the Administration, while identifying themselves with the Second Front movement.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C..

I believe the general consensus of opinion is to accept the leadership of the Government and support it, believing that if an invasion of the Continent is possible, it will be undertaken.

The visit of General Arnold and General Somervell, with others, has again centred interest on this subject, and has increased active consideration of the problem. It is my opinion, however, that action and success will depend on what General Somervell described to me as a "sustained excitement" on the part of the Prime Minister and the higher British military officers. It will take great determination and singleness of purpose to organize an invasion force large enough to divert German ground forces from the Eastern Front, or to occupy the mainland in sufficient depth to be in a position to compel a major diversion of the German Air Force from the Eastern to the Western Front. I believe a great deal more could be done than is now being done, but only with your personal intervention and vigorous support. I liked your message of June first to the Prime Minister. I felt the lift of it, as I am sure he did. At the same time, I thought your estimate of the Russian situation made it clear that it was of concern to us and called for action on our part.

I wired you this evening, asking for information as to the position you had taken in relation to the Russian demand for a Second Front, as I felt it would help me in working out your wishes with the British.

I have seen something of General De Gaulle lately, partly because Eden felt that I could help keep him in line, and also because I respect him as a fighting man. The Prime Minister this last week has had a more friendly attitude toward him, because of the gallant behaviour of the Free French unit fighting in Lybia. He asked Tommy Thompson to put on all his gold braid and deliver a message of congratulations to De Gaulle, because of the effective part they have played in the desert battle. I spent three hours with De Gaulle and with Eden, convincing De Gaulle of the stupidity of his press conference which appeared last week, and explained to him that to be friendly one minute and critical the next was not good enough. He told me he understood. Eden said afterwards that he had
never/

never seen him as reasonable or as friendly; but he may not stay put. It is De Gaulle's opinion that an invasion of France is necessary if we are to hold the French people, and that even if it resulted in another Dunkirk, it would be worth the effort. He is fearful that a failure to attempt an invasion will depress the French and increase German control in France.

I hope that you will have an opportunity to get Lyttelton's opinion on the independent elections, and also Averell's. Their opinions differ, but I feel that they could each throw some light on the general situation here. A victory in Lybia would, in my opinion, put the Prime Minister in a very strong position both in Parliament and in the country. At the moment, the British have prevented the Germans from carrying out their planned campaign, but Rommel is still strong, and both sides have suffered heavy casualties. The six-pounders have been effective, and Auchinleck has reported very favorably on the Grant tank. The Germans' initiating the attack allowed the English to get the slow infantry tank into early action in the engagement. The reports also show that the English concentrated their artillery fire against the enemy tanks, and used their own tanks against weaker objectives to a larger extent than in any previous engagement. A success in this campaign should particularly influence neutral opinion in Turkey and the Mediterranean, as well as general opinion elsewhere.

You undoubtedly know that Portal is the only Chief of Staff officer whom we can count on for the present to support an early '42 attack. Again reverting to this problem, I believe a Supreme Commander of all the services is necessary to ensure success, and the only man I can think of who is outstanding, to carry forward this project, is General Marshall. You might not be able to spare him, and the British would be reluctant to accept him, with Brooke against, Pound neutral, and Portal supporting.

The other day, I cabled you that I had been asked by all factions if I would sit in with the Pacific Council. I wired back that I thought this would/

75 05

would be a mistake. In the first place, it would be an effort to equalize representation in London and Washington; in the second place, I know little about the Pacific area and am far away from it; and in the third place, it would divide my influence in the area to which you have assigned me. I would like to be single-purposed in supporting a Western Front operation. If it is decided to build up a supporting war council or other agency for such an operation in London, I would like to serve on it, as I believe I could be of real assistance in carrying out a policy which you might lay down.

The other day, Mr. Devereux, who was connected with aircraft production, gave me the three enclosed snapshots. Two of them are of Doolittle and Royce, and the third is a very attractive picture of Elliott. I thought you might like them.

I always think of you, and miss seeing you very much. I hope we are getting done the things you want done here.

Please remember me to Harry.

With every good wish for yourself,

Sincerely,

John Gilbert W. W. W.

a75906

BAS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

PSF - Saf
London

Dated July 15, 1942

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

State Dept.
By J. Schauble Date FEB 1942

TRIPLE PRIORITY

3903, July 15, 2 p.m.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT

Maisky just came in to see me. He told me he had had a conference with the Prime Minister and Admiral Pound last night. Pound explained to him the losses suffered by the northern convoy and said he was opposed to continuing shipments over the northern route to Russia at this time. Maisky said he objected vigorously to this decision and was told by the Prime Minister and Pound that since many of our ships were involved the final decision would rest with us.

Maisky further told me that both he and his naval adviser do not feel that the last convoy was adequately protected or skillfully handled. Maisky was critical of Pound as an aggressive naval officer.

Maisky stated that he felt, at this time when Russia was under the greatest pressure and no apparent effort was being made here to establish a second front

a75h01

-2- #3903, July 15, 2 p.m. from London

front in time, that to discontinue the northern supply line would not be understood by his country and would be a serious mistake.

I have reported Maisky's conversation as accurately as I have been able to record it immediately after his leaving the room. I felt that it should be forwarded to you at once without further checking by me because of other messages which have been cabled to you by the Prime Minister and because of Maisky's statement to me that the Prime Minister and Pound told him that the final decision on the continuance or discontinuance of the convoys would be made by us.

WINANT

NPL

a75h02

PSF

Safe: Winant

Barf

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Winant

July 17, 1942

Dorothy:

This can be filed.

Lois

a75i01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dec. 29, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. H.

Will you read this over and
I will talk with you about it later?

F. D. R.

a75.02

AF
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 5:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

[REDACTED] TO THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER
SECRETARY.

At my request Lord Swinton furnished me with a memorandum on the (*)ity Executive of the British Government. I thought you might find it useful to have this at once and I am telegraphing the text herewith. In his covering letter, Lord Swinton, the head of the Executive, explains he has endeavored in the memorandum to anticipate the type of questions the American Government authorities might wish to ask and that he has tried to show what are the relations of the Executive with a variety of Government Departments and why it works as smoothly as it does. He mentions further that the spirit of approach is more than half the battle and that today all the Departments look upon the Executive not merely as a coordinator but as a helpful partner to which they gladly bring their problems. He continues that the

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

secret

By JS Date FEB 8 1972

a75:03

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from
London.

secret of this ~~lies~~ not in attempting to create new sections of one's own to do other peoples' work but to face up to problems, obtain the right solution and action required, assign the responsibility for action, and assist the Departments themselves to carry out that action.

Lord Swinton emphasizes that the Executive and its work are highly secret. Its existence was announced by the Prime Minister in the House, but he made it plain that no further information could be given about it. A prohibition has been placed upon the press from referring to any of its activities. Lord Swinton mentions that the memorandum is as full an account of the Executive and its operation as would be given to his own Ministers and he stresses that it would be very embarrassing to him and his work if anything were published in the United States which would not be allowed here. He expresses the hope that it will not be necessary to multiply copies of the memorandum in the United States.

I earnestly request that his wishes in the above regard will be respected.

The memorandum follows:

WINANT

(*) Apparent omission
ALC

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By JS Date FEB 8 1972

a75:04

AF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 9:20 a.m. ~~DECLASSIFIED~~

By Authority of State Dept.

Telegram 1-12-72

By JS Date Feb 8 1972

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

BEGIN MEMORANDUM:

The object of this paper is to show why the Security Executive was created the field it covers and how it works.

Definition of "Security".

By "Security" is meant the defense of national interests against hostile elements other than the armed forces of the enemy; in practice, against espionage, sabotage and attempts to procure defeat by subversive political activity. "Security" in this sense is not confined to the United Kingdom. It extends to British Colonies: to the Dominions and India with whom liaison is maintained: and it covers such British interests abroad as the security of British ships and cargoes in foreign ports.

Authorities responsible.

In Great Britain the authorities mainly responsible for security in this sense and the Home Office (and under their general direction the police forces)

the War

a75:05

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION TWO) from
London.

the War Office and the Commander in Chief Home Forces. Many other Departments and services, however, have security functions within their own sphere. The Service Departments are responsible for the security of the fighting services, their establishments and communications; the Production Departments for the security of factories and industrial plant; the Ministry of War Transport for the security of land and sea transport services. Other Departments actively assist those primarily responsible: Postal and Telegraph Censorship performs important security functions in the interception of communications and that Customs and Excise take part in security control at ports. Security in British Colonies is in the hands of the Colonial Governments reinforced in war by officers of the Security Service under the general direction of the Colonial Office. The Foreign Office together with the overseas representatives of the Admiralty and the Ministry of War Transport are concerned in the security of British interests abroad, especially British shipping in overseas ports. The Security Service is responsible for advising all these Departments on security measures and supplying them with relevant 'intelligence'.

EDA

WINANT

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

Dept. Telegram 1-12-72
By JS Date FEB 8 1972

a75i06

AF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 9:58 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION THREE)
the Security Executive.

With so many different authorities and so wide a range of activities there was danger of duplication and hiatus. To avoid this, the Security Executive was set up by the Prime Minister and was charged with the duty of coordinating all security activities, preventing overlapping and omissions affording opportunity for the sharing of experience and maintaining a proper balance between security and other national interests.

The Chairman of the Security Executive is responsible to the Prime Minister, and in the field of unified security to the Lord President of the Council who acts for the Prime Minister in this sphere. The Chairman of the Executive happens also to be the executive head of the Security Service; this, although convenient is not essential to his functions.

Membership of the Executive.

The Chairman

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

Dept telegram 1-12-72
FEB 8 1972

By JB Date 1-12-72

a75:07

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION THREE) from
London.

The Chairman is assisted by two independent members without departmental association or responsibilities, and by representatives of the Prime Minister and the Lord President of the Council. He holds regular meetings at which the great majority of the Departments enumerated above are continuously represented, together with those concerned with intelligence, including the intelligence directorates of the three fighting services. While the departments with general security or intelligence functions are always represented at each meeting, those with purely sectional interests attend only for the discussions which concern them. For special purposes representatives may be invited from any Department.

WINANT

WSB

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of State Dept.
Telegram 1-12-72
By JS Date FEB 8 1972

a75:08

EH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 10:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION FOUR).

Method of the Executive.

The title "Security Executive" is somewhat mislead-
ing to an outsider, as the Executive is a coordinating
body and does not itself take the operative action to
give effect to its recommendations. It is the function
of the Executive to see that security problems are
properly envisaged, that the best practical measures
are framed to meet them and that responsibility for
action is assigned to the appropriate departments.
It keeps in close touch with all departments to follow
up action and to see that recommendations are working
out satisfactorily in practice. At any moment problems
and action are reviewed. But the Executive has set
itself resolutely against doing the work of other depart-
ments. If a department needs strengthening or expanding
to undertake some new duty, the Executive makes the
necessary recommendations and gives the department all
the help it can; but the Executive does not supplant

the

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

Rept. Telegram 1-12-72

By JF Date FEB 8 1972

a75109

-2-#6234, (SEC. FOUR) from London. December 27, 7 a.m.

the department or try to do its job for it. This is one of the chief reasons why it works smoothly. Departmental jealousies are avoided; and the sound principle is followed that you do not get two bodies trying to do the same job, but assign the task to the right body and see that it is equipped to do it properly. In this way departments have come to look on the Executive not merely as a coordinator, still less as a rival, but I hope as a helpful partner to whom they readily bring their problems and their troubles.

The method of the Executive has been largely determined by the fact that it did not create the security system of Great Britain but found a large number of security problems needing urgent solution. In the early stages it was necessary for the chairman himself to bring forward subjects for consideration in order to ensure that no part of the field was overlooked. But as the usefulness of the machinery afforded by the Executive became apparent, the constituent departments have themselves tended more and more to raise of their own accord any problem in which a new question of principle is involved or which calls for cooperation with other departments. As a rule representatives are able to come to

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

Dept. Telegram 1-12-72

By [Signature] Date FEB 8 1972

a75:10

-3- #6234 (SECTION FOUR) from London. December 27, 7 a.m.

to meetings prepared to commit their departments so that action can be taken forthwith without reference back. The conclusions of the Executive are expressed in the form of recommendations for action by the department concerned. Usually these are readily carried out. If, as very rarely happens, a minister disagrees with a recommendation, he may refer it to the Prime Minister or to the Lord President.

WIMANT

WNC

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

Dept. telegram 1-12-72

By JS

Date

FEB 3 1972

a75:11

ES
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 27, 1941.

Rec'd. 10:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION FIVE)

Staff of the Executive: special conference.

The Executive is served by a small full time staff of civil servants headed as chief officer by the recently retired head of an important Department of State. It is their duty to keep the Executive informed of all questions arising for consideration and to issue the necessary memoranda, agenda, minutes and reports. (these are kept as brief as possible consistently with clarity and are formulated in confidence each copy being serially numbered and registered to the recipient). They arrange special conferences to consider questions which are not of sufficient importance to bring before the Executive or on which preliminary work is necessary and run committees appointed by the Executive to work out the detailed application of agreed policies or to take charge of questions requiring continuous and detailed oversight. It is the function of this staff to follow up the

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of State Dept.
Telegram 1-12-72
By JS Date FEB 8 1972

a75:12

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from London

up the Executive's recommendations to see that they are carried out and that they prove workable in practice.

Liaison officers.

The Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, Home Office, G H Q (Home forces) Ministry of Information, Postal and Telegraphic Censorship, Secret Intelligence Service, Security Service and Metropolitan Police have regular liaison officers attached to the staff by the Executive. In this way daily contact is maintained between the Security, Executive and these departments. This has many advantages. Security Intelligence coming from any source at home or abroad is pooled and the liaison officer insures that such information at once reaches the branch of his ministry most directly concerned. Prompt consultation can take place between the chairman or his chief officer and several departments;

WINANT

LWC

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

Dept Telegram 1-12-72

By JS

Date FEB 6 1972

a75:13

BAS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (3)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 11:23 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION SIX)

and action can be rapidly agreed and taken. The
liaison officers also meet regularly under the
chairmanship of the chief officer. This affords
a means of pooling detailed information and dis-
posing shortly of minor matters which would often
otherwise waste considerable time in correspondence
between departments. It is particularly successful
in dealing with false reports and ill-founded
suspicions or proposals which in security and
intelligence matters are continually reaching
the authorities from official and unofficial
quarters.

Principles on which the Executive works.

In this way the Executive has covered in
the eighteen months of its operation every aspect
of security in Great Britain and many questions of
security overseas. In so doing it has aimed at
assessing the true importance of each apprehended
danger and at maintaining a just balance between

security

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

Dept Telegram 1-12-72

By JS

Date 1972

a75:14

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 p.m. (SECTION SIX) from
London

security and other vital interests. To achieve this and to see the various risks and competing interest in their true perspective requires a detached and central viewpoint which can seldom be attained by departments in isolation with their own special interests paramount. At the Executive, however, after hearing each other's point of view departments can frequently agree that a risk has been overrated or that some restriction is purchasing security by hindering war production or essential transport services; or conversely that the needs of security compel precautions or restrictions the inconvenience or disadvantage of which must be accepted in the national interest.

WINANT

ALC

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of State
Dept Telegram 1-12-72
By JS Date FEB 8 1972

a75:15

38
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (3)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd. 12:32 a.m., 28th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION SEVEN)

In addition to such specific problems the Execu-
tive has inevitably been concerned with general
questions of organization. Here the policy of coor-
dination has been carried right down to the sub-
ordinate officials of the departments concerned
throughout the country providing all with general
guidance, linking the police forces with the regional
organization of the security service and with the
local commands of the fighting forces and arranging
for the widest possible distribution within each ser-
vice of information on the activities of the others.
The assignment of departmental responsibilities has
led naturally to the delimitation of the functions of
their respective officials so that in each locality
the representatives of the various authorities may
work together as a team.

Scope of the Executive's work.

The scope of the Executive's work may best be
illustrated by the attached list of subjects which

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of State have been

Dept. telegram 1-12-72
FEB 8 1972

By JF

Date 1-12-72

a75:16

-2- 6234, December 27, 7 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN) from London

have been dealt with by the Executive itself, one of its committees or the liaison officers' conference. It may be useful, however, to give some typical examples in greater detail as follows.

A port security. Questions affecting port security have covered a wide range, e.g. security of docks and ships, conditions affecting British, allied and neutral seamen, the examination of passengers outgoing and incoming including refugees censorship of documents on passengers and ships, maintaining the secrecy of ships' destinations and other important information. A number of departments are involved: Admiralty, War Office, Ministry of War Transport, port authorities, Ministry of Labor, Home Office immigration and customs offices, censorship, security, service and local police forces. In facing the many problems an attempt is made to reconcile the needs of security with the practical working of the port.

WINANT

KLP

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

Dept. Telegram 1-12-72

By JA Date 1972

a75117

AS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 2 a.m.; 28th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION EIGHT)

(B) Alien's policy. The initial policy (in which the Executive had no part) was to impose on enemy aliens restrictions graduated according to their estimated potential danger. In the period of extreme emergency, however, after Dunkirk with invasion an immediate possibility, the Executive advised a policy of general internment always with the intention that the internees should be sifted on their individual merits in accordance with principles yet to be devised. These principles were worked out in consultation with the Executive and became the "categories of release" under which the great majority of the internees were released, some unconditionally, some subject to restrictions. As the danger has become less immediate, it has been possible to adopt a more liberal policy based on principles carefully worked out in the light of accumulated

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of State Intelligence.
Rept. telegram 1-12-72
By JS Date FEB 8 1972

a75118

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION EIGHT)
from London

intelligence. In this way, the liberty of the subject has been reconciled with the security of the state.

(C) Subversive activities. It is the duty of the Executive to watch through the various investigating departments the activities of all movements which are or maybe subversive and to recommend whatever action maybe necessary from time to time. Thus the Executive has recommended action against the British Union of Fascists and the proscription of the organization. The activities of the Communist party of Great Britain have been closely watched and their effect on public opinion carefully estimated. Official action has been recommended from time to time and the Executive has been able to expose the penetration of the party into many apparently reputable organizations and in particular its attempts to undermine the authority of trade unions. Pacifist organizations have been similarly watched though it has not been necessary to recommend any special action.

WINANT

NX

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of *State*

Dept. telegram 1-12-72

By *JL* Date FEB 8 1972

a75:19

PAS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 5:20 a.m.; 28th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION NINE)

(D). Anti Sabotage. To the existing general anti-sabotage measures the Executive was able to apply intelligence indicating that the enemy seemed likely to undertake a particular type of sabotage. Special precautions were therefore concentrated on the points most vulnerable to this form of attack and on the sources from which material for the attack seemed most likely to be drawn.

(E). Control of Entry. The Executive arranged facilities for the examination at a central point of all refugees and other aliens arriving in Great Britain whose entry had not been authorized beforehand. The reception center at which these people are interrogated has been administered under the guidance of a committee of the departments concerned under the Executive; they have been able to provide for essential security and intelligence interests and to obtain a large measure of cooperation

from the

By Authority of State

Dept Telegram 1-12-72

By JS Date FEB 8 1972

a75:20

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from
London.

from the allied Governments at present in Great Britain.

(F). Colonial Security. The existing security system in British colonies in West Africa and the Caribbean has been specially reviewed by the Executive with the Colonial Office and other departments concerned. Experience gained in Great Britain has been adapted to the particular needs of each locality and where necessary reinforcement of the existing security organization has been effected either by sending out the necessary personnel from Great Britain or by appointing suitably qualified officers from the local British community.

WINANT

REP

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of State
Dept. Telegram 1-12-72
By JA Date DEC 3 1972
a75:21

BAS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 7:05 a.m.; 28th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION TEN)

(G) Security in South America. In consultation with British Security Coordination in New York a special mission was sent to South America and was successful in establishing in each important port there a local security organization consisting of a security officer experienced in shipping practice and bureaus and a committee composed partly of the British officials on the spot and partly of prominent British residents. The officers were carefully briefed in their new duties and have been able to effect considerable improvements to security in their own localities.

List of subjects covered by security is not complete.

One. Espionage.

Arrangements with police and military commands for dealing with suspected enemy agents.

Facilities for interrogation and detention

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

conspirers

Dept. telegram 1-12-72

By JA Date EEB 8 1972

a75:22

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION TEN) from
London

conspirers guidance to police on technique of enemy
agents.

Two. Sabotage.

Preventive measures general and special.

Control of firearms, explosives and chemicals.

Arrangements for coordinated investigation and
regular reports.

Three. Subversive Activities.

The British union of Fascists.

The Communist Party of Great Britain and
satellite organizations.

Trotskyist organizations.

Pacifist "religious" and conscientious objectors
organizations.

Four. Other Fifth Column Activities.

Precautions against bogus notices pamphlets
messages requisites.

Control of uniforms badges emblems requisites.

Action against the spreading of malicious or
defeatist rumors.

Watch on enemy broadcasts masquerading as
British.

Five. Aliens.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

Dept Telegram 1-12-72
FEB 8 1972

By JH Date

Policy

a75:23

-3- #6234, December 27; 7 a.m. (SECTION TEN) from London

Policy of internment and release.

Police and Johnstone registration.

Restrictions on movement employment et cetera.

Privileges for allied nationals.

Safeguarding employment of prisoners of war.

Registration of the recently naturalized

WINANT

RR

RECEIVED
Authority of State Dept.
telegram 1-12-72
By JS Date FEB 6 1972
a75124

BS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd. 10:20 p.m., 28th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION ELEVEN)

Six. CONTROL OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

CENSORSHIP: Press, postal and telegraph,
travelers.

Special censorship of mail from internment
camps and protected areas: between Great Britain
and Ireland: of documents carried by ships' crews.

Control of cameras, binoculars, telescopes,
radio equipment and high frequency electrical ap-
paratus.

Control of codes, secret inks, light and flag
signals, pigeons, et cetera.

Propaganda against careless talk.

Special control of information about the loca-
tion and activities of factories, Government depart-
ments, military establishments, (?) movements of
population, port facilities, air raid damage. Special
control of information obtainable from government
departments, government contractors, labor recruiting

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

Dept. Telegram 1-12-72

By J Date FEB 8 1972

Agents,

a75125

-2- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION ELEVEN) from London

agents, fire insurance proposal forms and the published accounts and reports of companies, public utilities, local authorities, et cetera.

Seven. IDENTITY CARDS, PASSES AND PERMITS

Value of identity cards for security purposes.

Production of identity cards at hotels and boarding houses.

Special identity cards for seamen and other special classes.

Eight. SECURITY OF SPECIAL LOCALITIES

Security measures in (*):

Operational or training areas.

Government and service establishments, aerodromes, internment camp.

Factories, depots, public utilities, et cetera.

Ports, docks (?) yards.

Nine. CONTROL OF ENTRY EXIT, TRAVEL FACILITIES

Issue of visas: examination of arrivals.

Exit permits: repatriation policy.

Port control: coordination always in port security services.

Control of air and steamship lines.

Ten. SHIPPING SECURITY

Prevention of subversion of crews.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

Dept Telegram

By 1-18-72 Date

Special

a75126

-3- #6234, December 27, 7 a.m. (SECTION ELEVEN) from London

Special measures to control information regard-
ing convoys.

Special anti-sabotage precautions make this.

Eleven. OVERSEAS SECURITY.

Security measures in and for:

British colonies (West Africa and West Indies)

British Central Africa Dominions.

British interests overseas.

(END MEMORANDUM)

(END OF MESSAGE)

WIN.LNT

WNC

(*) Apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of State
Dept. telegram 1-12-72
By JL FEB 0..